Thursday, January 12, 2006
Rosett On Oil-For-Food: Closing In
Claudia Rosett details new information on the relationship between UN SecGens old and new, the UN Oil-For-Food program and Iraqi dictator/UN puppetmaster Saddam Hussein. Once again, Maurice Strong looms large.
A brief history:
When Annan took over as U.N. Secretary General from Boutros-Ghali in January 1997, Oil-for-Food was just one month old. Set up as a temporary and ad-hoc effort to deliver relief to the citizens of Saddam Hussein's U.N.-sanctioned Iraq, the program was run at the start by two separate departments within the Secretariat. One dealt with the sanctions aspects of the program, another with the humanitarian-relief aspects. One of Annan's first acts, under the label of reform, was to reconfigure the Secretariat. Among the changes Annan made that first year was the consolidation of Oil-for-Food under a single newly created unit, called the "Office of the Iraq Programme," reporting directly to him, as secretary general.
The effect of this change was to tilt the supervision of Oil-for-Food away from the Security Council, strengthening the control and secrecy with which the program was run by the Secretariat. While the program still had to be renewed every six months by the Security Council, Annan presented report after report, based on information filtered selectively from the Iraq program office, urging not only that Oil-for-Food continue, but that it be radically expanded in size and scope, with Saddam allowed to spend billions in relief funds to revive his decrepit oil industry. As Oil-for-Food grew, the corruption grew too, into a multibillion-dollar extravaganza of kickbacks, smuggling, and payoffs.
The longtime U.N. staffer appointed by Annan to head the new office was Benon Sevan, who then ran the office for its entire duration, from 1997-2003. Sevan was alleged last year by both congressional investigators and Volcker's committee to have taken bribes from Saddam. (Sevan denies this. He was last reported to be in Cyprus, which has no extradition treaty with the U.S.)
The creation of the Iraq-program office does not figure in Volcker's chronology of Park's dealings with Strong, and the timeline that follows may well be a coincidence. Maurice Strong, whose old U.N. number now gives a forwarding message to an office in Canada, did not return a phone call requesting comment. But again, here is what the available records show:
When Annan sent to the General Assembly on July 14, 1997, his plan, "Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform," which made the first mention of the change in Oil-for-Food's structure, Annan singled out for thanks one person by name, and that person was Strong: "I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the important contributions made to this effort by the Executive Coordinator for Reform, Mr. Maurice Strong, and his small but highly motivated team."
The reform plan included a single sentence outlining the future management structure of Oil-for-Food (the U.N. text mistakenly cited the year 1991 instead of 1995 as the date the program was approved by the Security Council): "The management of the Iraq Programme, established by the Security Council resolution 986 (1991), will be handled by a special unit within the secretariat."
This proposal was buried deep in the reform plan, as the last line of paragraph #187, on page 61 of a document running to more than 91 pages. A casual reader might have gone right by it. But to anyone with a strong interest in Iraq, and especially in Oil-for-Food, that single sentence would have come as significant news. In effect, it said that Oil-for-Food was no longer ad-hoc and "temporary," but about to be incorporated into the U.N. system as a special office under the secretary-general. This moved the program closer to terms that, according to Volcker, Iraq had angled for unsuccessfully in 1996 negotiations with the U.N. — with the Iraqi delegation arguing that the mechanics should involve what Volcker described as "an agreement between Iraq and the Secretary-General."
A brief history:
When Annan took over as U.N. Secretary General from Boutros-Ghali in January 1997, Oil-for-Food was just one month old. Set up as a temporary and ad-hoc effort to deliver relief to the citizens of Saddam Hussein's U.N.-sanctioned Iraq, the program was run at the start by two separate departments within the Secretariat. One dealt with the sanctions aspects of the program, another with the humanitarian-relief aspects. One of Annan's first acts, under the label of reform, was to reconfigure the Secretariat. Among the changes Annan made that first year was the consolidation of Oil-for-Food under a single newly created unit, called the "Office of the Iraq Programme," reporting directly to him, as secretary general.
The effect of this change was to tilt the supervision of Oil-for-Food away from the Security Council, strengthening the control and secrecy with which the program was run by the Secretariat. While the program still had to be renewed every six months by the Security Council, Annan presented report after report, based on information filtered selectively from the Iraq program office, urging not only that Oil-for-Food continue, but that it be radically expanded in size and scope, with Saddam allowed to spend billions in relief funds to revive his decrepit oil industry. As Oil-for-Food grew, the corruption grew too, into a multibillion-dollar extravaganza of kickbacks, smuggling, and payoffs.
The longtime U.N. staffer appointed by Annan to head the new office was Benon Sevan, who then ran the office for its entire duration, from 1997-2003. Sevan was alleged last year by both congressional investigators and Volcker's committee to have taken bribes from Saddam. (Sevan denies this. He was last reported to be in Cyprus, which has no extradition treaty with the U.S.)
The creation of the Iraq-program office does not figure in Volcker's chronology of Park's dealings with Strong, and the timeline that follows may well be a coincidence. Maurice Strong, whose old U.N. number now gives a forwarding message to an office in Canada, did not return a phone call requesting comment. But again, here is what the available records show:
When Annan sent to the General Assembly on July 14, 1997, his plan, "Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform," which made the first mention of the change in Oil-for-Food's structure, Annan singled out for thanks one person by name, and that person was Strong: "I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the important contributions made to this effort by the Executive Coordinator for Reform, Mr. Maurice Strong, and his small but highly motivated team."
The reform plan included a single sentence outlining the future management structure of Oil-for-Food (the U.N. text mistakenly cited the year 1991 instead of 1995 as the date the program was approved by the Security Council): "The management of the Iraq Programme, established by the Security Council resolution 986 (1991), will be handled by a special unit within the secretariat."
This proposal was buried deep in the reform plan, as the last line of paragraph #187, on page 61 of a document running to more than 91 pages. A casual reader might have gone right by it. But to anyone with a strong interest in Iraq, and especially in Oil-for-Food, that single sentence would have come as significant news. In effect, it said that Oil-for-Food was no longer ad-hoc and "temporary," but about to be incorporated into the U.N. system as a special office under the secretary-general. This moved the program closer to terms that, according to Volcker, Iraq had angled for unsuccessfully in 1996 negotiations with the U.N. — with the Iraqi delegation arguing that the mechanics should involve what Volcker described as "an agreement between Iraq and the Secretary-General."
